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Abstract
Social media enable politicians to personalize their campaigns and target voters who
may be decisive for the outcome of elections. We assess the effects of such politi-
cal “micro-targeting” by exploiting variation in daily advertising prices on Facebook,
collected during the course of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. We analyze the
variation of prices across political ideologies and propose a measure for the intensity of
online political campaigns. Combining this measure with information from the ANES
electoral survey, we address two fundamental questions: (i) To what extent did politi-
cal campaigns use social media to micro-target voters? (ii) How large was the effect, if
any, on voters who were heavily exposed to campaigning on social media? We find that
online political campaigns targeted on users’ gender, geographic location, and political
ideology had a significant effect in persuading undecided voters to support Mr Trump,
and in persuading Republican supporters to turn out on polling day. Moreover the
effect of micro-targeting on Facebook was strongest among users without university or
college-level education.
∗We thank Greg Crawford, Marko Koethenbuerger, James Fenske and seminar participants at Universities
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PET 18 (Hue), Workshop on Political Economy (University of Bolzano), Political Economy Workshop (Uni-
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“I doubt I would be here if it weren’t for social media, to be honest with you” (President
Donald Trump. October 22, 2017)
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the role played by social media in shaping political campaigns and
election outcomes. Social media, including Facebook, Google, Twitter and YouTube, have
gained prominence as tools for political campaigning in the United States and in several
other countries. The 2008 U.S. presidential election was the first in which candidates used
social media for direct political campaigning. Since then, the role of social media in the
worldwide political scene has grown considerably.
According to the 2016 Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center, 2016a, 2016b
and 2016c), about 70 percent of Americans have a Facebook account, and most of them
access it on a daily basis. Some 20 percent of Americans have a Twitter account. About
one-quarter of these individuals who have social media accounts report that “a lot” of what
they see on such platforms is related to politics.1 Facebook ranked as the third-most-cited
“main source” of information for the 2016 U.S. presidential election.2
While Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s campaign was run mainly on tra-
ditional media, social media, particularly Facebook and Twitter, were among Republican
candidate Donald Trump’s primary communication channels. Using data from the the Fed-
eral Election Commission, Williams, Girish and Gulati (2017) calculated that during the
1Figures are somewhat similar for European countries, with a 2016 Eurobarometer survey reporting that
40 percent of Europeans use social media daily, and that about 33 percent (16 percent) of Europeans indicate
Internet (social media) as the major source of “most of their news on national political matters”.
2At the end of the 2012 U.S. Presidential campaign, the Pew Research Center reported that 12 percent
of Americans had regularly received their campaign news from Facebook. This put the social media site on
par with national newspapers. By 2016, these figures had grown substantially. By then an estimated 79
percent of adults who use online information access (roughly 68 percent of all Americans) used Facebook,
and an estimated three-quarters of these Facebook users accessed the site daily.
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period from July 1 to November 30 2016, Hillary Clinton’s campaign spent 8 percent of
overall media expenditures on digital media, whereas Donald Trump’s campaign spent over
47 percent.3 Moreover, in the same period, according to Bloomberg (2018), Donald Trump’s
campaign spent 44 million dollars on Facebook ads compared with 28 million dollars by
Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Many practitioners, scholars and journalists have put forward
the idea that Facebook and Twitter may have significantly contributed to Donald Trump’s
election as US President.
Social media provide politicians with new and more sophisticated channels for
reaching voters and targeting their messages across audiences with different political orien-
tations. Targeting on Internet platforms, such as Google and Facebook, is potentially much
more precise than on traditional media outlets, thanks to technologies such as behavioral
micro-targeting (i.e. the tracing of dynamic behavioral patterns, interests and networks),
that exploit extensive quantities of user-generated data. For example, to facilitate the iden-
tification of different audiences, in 2016 Facebook began classifying its U.S. users in terms
of political orientation (conservative, liberal and moderate) and interests (on specific candi-
dates, issues, or initiatives). As a result, political campaigns are increasingly relying on social
media, while comparatively reducing their focus on traditional media outlets.4 However, tar-
geting is not a new concept; on television, for example, political campaigns target potential
voters by paying for advertisements during shows that attract viewers who lean toward a
certain political ideology, or belong to a certain demographic group. The key advantage of
social media is that targeting can be far more precise.5
As far as we are aware, this paper offers the first attempt in the political and eco-
3According to the authors, Clinton spent 252 million dollars for advertising in total and Trump 176
million dollars.
4PEW also reported that between 2016 and 2017 the gap between television and online news consumption
narrowed from 19 percentage points to 7 percentage points.
5Social media offer also other advantages, with respect to traditional media, which we do not explore in
this paper. For example, they allow candidates to observe real time feedback on the course of their political
campaign, and adjust strategies accordingly. They also offer to spread campaign messages quickly and at
low cost, by exploiting users networks.
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nomic literature to measure (i) the extent of the political campaigns conducted via Facebook
to micro-target voters, and (ii) the effect that these campaigns have had on the behavior of
those voters who relied mainly on social media to gather political information.
To address the first point, we need information on the intensity of political cam-
paigns conducted on Facebook to reach different voters. This is a difficult task, because,
unlike traditional media, digital platforms are not required to disclose information regarding
the source, amount and content of campaign spending (regulated in the United States by the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971). At present, Facebook does not disclose information
about the content of ads.6 Given this lack of information, we conduct our analysis exploit-
ing variations in Facebook advertising prices for different audiences, as defined by locations,
political ideology and demographics, during the critical campaign months leading up to the
2016 U.S. presidential election. The idea is that if political micro-targeting was extensively
used as a way to reach voters during the campaign, its effect on the online advertising mar-
ket should be observable through the difference in prices across various political audiences.
Specifically, given the size of the audiences (which, as we document below, are largely stable
during our observation period), higher competition between the candidates targeting a given
audience (a positive demand shift) pushes up the price of advertising to that audience. This,
in turn, conveys information about politicians’ strategies, revealing, for example, the value
that politicians place on different types of voters in different states (e.g., partisan or swing
states) at different points in time (e.g., after an election poll). Following this logic, we use
variations in advertising prices across political audiences as a measure of the intensity of
Facebook political campaigning.
6Facebook recently announced that it will implement measures to increase transparency following reports
that more than 3,000 ads linked to Russia, addressing divisive social issues and allegedly favoring Donald
Trump, circulated on its platform during the 2016 presidential campaign. These ads were reportedly seen by
an estimated 10 million people. Facebook has vowed to enable users to see the content of political ads posted
on its site, making them visible to any Facebook user. In October 2017, U.S. Senators Amy Klobuchar, Mark
Warner and John McCain introduced the “Honest Ads Act” bill as a response to the scandal, with the intent
of regulating online campaign advertising.
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To this end, we construct a novel database, based on a scraping technology, which
gathered daily unit prices for online advertising on the social media platform. Prices are spe-
cific to audiences characterized by political ideology, political interest (in a given candidate),
gender, age, race, education level, and location (within the United States). The database
covers a period of approximately 12 months, from April 2016 until March 2017. The output
of this exercise provides audience-level predictions for exposure to political advertising. It is
important to stress that the use of the Facebook marketing API (Application Programming
Interface) data does not create any privacy risk for Facebook users.7
Our second objective is to study the effect of Facebook political advertising on
voter behavior. To address this point, we combine information on individual exposure to
political campaigns with data from the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES,
2017). This data contains individual responses regarding social media and Facebook usage,
as well as voting behaviors, political preferences, demographic and economic characteristics
of a sample of 2,414 American voters interviewed before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential
elections. Political ideology, demographic characteristics and geographical location allow us
to match each user to a specific audience, as defined in our Facebook ad-price data. Intensity
to online digital campaigns aimed at the audience to which the user is matched gives us a
proxy for the intensity of the online campaign during the period preceding or following the
interview date. This makes it possible to compare different respondents in different markets,
in terms of their relative exposure to different levels of political campaigning. We focus on
7The European Union’s GDPR, one of the most restrictive data protection regulations to date, defines
what personal data is in its Article 4: “‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person”. The Facebook marketing API only
provides aggregate numbers of targeted audiences. For instance if someone queries for the audience “ Users
in Spain, aged between 20 and 30, male and interested in Science” the only information she will get is the
number of Facebook users within that audience. To the best of our knowledge it is unfeasible to retrieve the
identity of the actual users included in that audience. Based on the GDPR definition of personal data the
Facebook marketing API data used in our research cannot be considered as personal data. Therefore, there
is no privacy/data protection risks for Facebook users derived from our research.
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the effect of advertising exposure on voter turnout and candidate choice. We are able to
identify this effect, due to the fact that users exposure to the social media platform (i.e.
how often they access the platform to gather political information) is a pre-determined time
invariant characteristic, whereas intensity of the campaign during the period going from the
interview up to the elections depends on the random assignment of respondents to different
interview dates.
Overall, our results indicate that online political campaigns targeting Facebook
users by gender, location and political allegiance had a significant effect on voting behavior.
The results suggest that social media campaigns were particularly successful in persuading
undecided voters to support Mr Trump and in persuading Republican supporters to turn
out on election day. Specifically, we find that targeted Facebook campaigning increased
turnout among core Republican voters but not among Democrats or Independent voters.
This positive effect on Republican voters’ turnout is large in magnitude. Our estimates
indicate that exposure to political ads on Facebook adds between five and ten percent to the
probability to vote. Furthermore, we find that targeted Facebook campaigning increased the
probability that a previously non-aligned voter would vote for Donald Trump, by at least
five percent if the voter used Facebook regularly. Similar figures hold for those who do not
have a university or college- degree. We also find that this micro-targeting was ineffective for
Clinton, failing to boost turnout or to sway voters in her favor. Finally, targeted Facebook
campaigning appears to have reduced the probability of a voter changing their mind about
which candidate to support among male individuals without college education and supporting
the Republican party (although the coefficients are weakly significant). This result provides
some support for the hypothesis that exposure to social media strengthens polarization.
Finally, a simple test carried out at the end of our analysis suggests that reading political
ads on Facebook does not make individuals more politically informed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Session discusses
5
related literature. Section 3 introduces our measure for political campaign intensity using
online ads prices. Section 4 analyzes the effect of political ads on voter behavior. The last
part of the paper presents a discussion of the results and concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
This study contributes to a number of literature streams. First, it relates to the literature
that focuses on the effect of different media outlets in channeling the messages of political
campaigns to voters. This literature obtains mixed results. Political campaigns on television
seem to be effective in persuading voters (for example Lovett (2015); Gerber et al. (2011);
Freedman, Franz and Goldstein (2004); Huber and Arceneaux (2007); and Gordon and
Hartmann (2016)), but less so in mobilizing voter turnout (Krasno and Green (2008), Huber
and Arceneaux (2007), and Gordon and Hartmann (2013) ). The introduction of radio
broadcasting is associated with an increase in voter turnout in the United States (Stro¨mberg,
2008), while the availability of television (Gentzkow, 2006) and, more recently, high-speed
Internet (Falck et al., 2014) is associated with lower voter turnout. DellaVigna and Kaplan
(2007) investigate the effect of news bias in media outlets and find that the introduction of
Fox News significantly affected the Republican vote shares in the presidential elections held
in 1996 and 2000. We contribute to this literature by providing a novel measure of exposure
to political targeting on social media and measuring the effect of this targeting on voter
turnout and choice of candidate.
There is a literature that focuses on the link between voter targeting and the can-
didates’ key campaign goals. Two main results emerge from this literature: when aiming to
persuade voters, politicians should target swing or undecided voters to try to reach those
who may switch preferences (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987); when aiming to mobilize voters to
turn out, politicians should target “natural” core supporters to try to reach those who do not
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usually vote (Nichter, 2008). There is some empirical evidence for both of these strategies.
For example, Hillygus and Shields (2008) find that candidates target weak partisans of the
opposing party. Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson (2004) and Shaw (2006) found that in the
2000 and 2004 US presidential elections, both parties concentrated their campaign visits and
television ads on the same set of battleground states. Fletcher and Slutsky (2011) show that
parties target the media markets that contain the most persuadable voters. Ridout et al.
(2012) argue that Democratic and Republican presidential candidates target different genres
with their television advertisements. By analyzing the variation in Facebook advertising
prices for different audiences and states, we can shed some light on political targeting strate-
gies on social media during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Recently, the literature has
devoted increasing attention to how campaigning adapts to the diffusion of the Internet and
social media. Bond et al. (2012) estimate that about 340,000 extra people turned out to
vote in the 2010 U.S. congressional elections because of a single Facebook political mobiliza-
tion message. Their results suggest that micro-targeting is an effective way to reach voters.
Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) show that social media was an important source of information
during the 2016 US presidential elections campaign and that most American adults were
exposed to at least one piece of fake information on the Internet. Furthermore, individuals
with ideologically segregated social media networks are more likely to believe fake stories.
Several authors, including Sunstein (2001; 2009; 2017), Pariser (2011), and Gabler
(2016), claim that the rise of the Internet and social media has contributed to voters’ political
polarization. They contend that social media favors the creation of “echo chambers” in which
individuals are exposed only to like-minded sources of information. Furthermore, by giving
candidates the opportunity to tailor their messages to the specific views of each recipient,
digital media may induce campaigns to take a more extremist tone. Sunshine, Hillygus and
Shields (2008) show that candidates are more likely to campaign on wedge issues (such as
immigration, abortion, and religion) when the forum is not public. However, relying on
evidence from demographics, Boxell et al. (2017) cast some doubt on the hypothesis that
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the Internet and social media cause polarization. In a similar vein, Barbera´ (2015) uses data
from Twitter to argue that social media actually reduce polarization, facilitating exposure
to information from individuals with whom users have weak ties and are thus more likely to
have contrasting political views.
With very few exceptions (cited above), previous literature relies on indirect evi-
dence of the effects of social media and microtargeted ads on voter behavior.8 This is most
likely due to the lack of data regarding these media outlets. We circumvent this problem, by
collecting the data on Facebook advertising prices, and building a metric for the intensity of
the political campaign conducted on Facebook. Furthermore, we contribute to literature by
linking Facebook advertising data to individual voting behavior and personal characteristics.
Comparing Facebook users and non-users’ political behavior,we are aggbledb to measure the
effect of the online campaign on different audiences.
Finally, our study belongs to a novel multidisciplinary literature that leverages
Facebook Marketing API data to address socio-economic issues. Gonza´lez Caban˜as et al.
(2018) quantify how many Facebook users in the European Union may be labeled with
”sensitive” interests (according to the definition provided in the General Data Protection
Regulation). They show that 73 percent of EU Facebook users may be labeled with such
sensitive interests.9 Zagheni et al. (2017) and Dubois et al. (2018) have used Facebook
marketing API data to study migration stocks and assimilation, collecting the number of
expats of different nationalities living in a particular country. Garcia et al. (2018) use
Facebook marketing data to perform a comprehensive analysis of the gender divide world-
8A few studies focus on political candidates’ use of Twitter (see Gainus and Wagner, (2014), and Bright
et al. (2017). Petrova et al. (2017) track candidates’ entry on Twitter during the latest U.S. congressional
elections, and find that opening a Twitter account helps new candidates increase their donations by up to 3
percent.
9In earlier studies, Liu et al. (2014) perform a quantitative analysis of the auction system in Facebook
demonstrating the huge difference of advertising prices (i.e., CPM and CPC) over different demographic
parameters. Saez-Trumper et al. (2014) generate a model to reflect how FB users’ activity (e.g., likes,
shares) is propagated to friends together with a second simplistic model that guesses the number of ad
impressions received per user.
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wide.
3 Online Advertising Prices and Political Campaign
Intensity
During electoral campaigns, political advertising takes over available airtime and advertising
space in traditional media, particularly in countries with low regulation, such as the United
States.10 During this time, non-political advertisers find the market to be highly saturated,
and experience considerable increase in ad prices. Price fluctuations are even stronger in the
case of the Internet and social media, where no regulation applies. During campaign season,
candidates compete with each other to attract the attention of politically relevant audiences,
(see Figure 1). They do so by entering the digital auctions held by Internet platforms (details
on the functioning of these auctions are discussed in the Appendix, sections A.1 and A.2).
For these reasons, we argue that observing online ads price fluctuations provides a novel tool
to proxy for the intensity of political campaigning. In fact, we expect that the willingness to
pay for ads targeted at a given audience will be, for any political candidate, proportional to
the probability of such ads in convincing members of that audience to vote for that candidate.
In turn, the value of convincing a selected audience, depends on the perceived effect on the
election by gaining support from voters in that audience will have on winning the election
(Moshary, 2017).
10The United States has a very liberal market for broadcasting political messages on television and radio
media. By contrast, many other countries restrict the use of media to broadcast advertising with political
content. For example, paid television and radio political advertising is generally not allowed in member
countries of the European Union. The United Kingdom and Ireland also forbid paid television and radio
from airing political advertisements, but allow political parties a limited and regulated number of political
broadcasts in the period immediately preceding the elections. Canada allows political broadcasts, but strictly
regulates airways access.
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3.1 Theoretical Background
The mechanism mentioned above can be illustrated through a simple model. Consider a
given audience, defined by a set of characteristics (e.g., income, age, gender, and political
preferences). Assume consumers within the audience are identical. We assume that con-
sumers are willing to tolerate a limited number of ads while browsing the digital platform.
Let q¯ be the reservation level of advertising that consumers are willing to be exposed to.
This level is the highest quantity of ads such that users do not lose interest in the platform.
Assume that q¯ is known to the platform, and that there is no marginal cost of providing
ads. Given these conditions, the quantity of ads the platform exposes each consumer to is
inelastic and equal to q¯11 (see Figure 2).
We consider two states of the world, indexed by i = {0, E}. State 0 is such that
there are no elections and, thus, no political candidates (C) aiming to reach voters on the
platform. In this state, there is only a generic, non-political, advertiser G, whose demand
for ads (per consumer) is pG(q).
12 In this state, the equilibrium (denoted with subscript 0)
is such that q0G = q¯. State E, instead, captures a situation when elections approach and
political candidates look to reach voters. Hence, in addition to the demand from the generic
advertiser (that we assume is the same as in the no-elections state), there is a demand for
ads by political candidates , denoted pC(q). We represent this additional demand in the
right panel of Figure 2, whereas the left panel depicts the aggregate demand for ads. The
equilibrium (subscript i = E) is such that the price of ads, pE, is higher than in state
0 (we assume the consumers’ tolerance for ads does not change between the two states).
Furthermore, although the total quantity of ads (per consumer) remains equal to q¯, ads
that would otherwise be allocated to the generic advertiser are allocated to the political
11We assume demand by advertisers is large enough to saturate the reservation quantity of ads.
12We assume that p′G(q) < 0, as the marginal value of an impression on a consumer is decreasing.
For example, assuming advertising is informative, the more an ad is shown to a consumer, the higher the
probability the consumer is already aware of its content. See, e.g., Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger (2016).
10
campaigns. In Figure 2, we also consider a more relevant increase in demand from political
candidates. As the figure suggests, the stronger the demand increase, the higher is the price in
equilibrium and, importantly, the larger the quantity of ads allocated to political campaigns
(superscript +). Therefore, a higher price for advertising in proximity of elections is also
indicative of higher exposure to political ads. Note that, in the empirical application, we
consider several different audiences that could differ in their tolerance to ads. Although we
do not observe this tolerance (nor the total quantity of ads to which consumers are exposed),
we shall control for many observable factors (income, age, gender, location, education, etc.)
that are reasonably correlated with ad tolerance.
Insert Figure 2 in about here
3.2 The Construction of a New Measure for Intensity of Political
Campaigns
Motivated by the above discussion, we collect data on online ad prices for the largest social
media network, Facebook. We then construct price indexes that proxy for the intensity of
(Facebook) online political campaigns. By campaign intensity, we mean the effort made
by candidates to influence an audience; this effort is directly reflected in the strength of
the bidding competition to target that audience. To show that our online ad price indexes
effectively capture the intensity of political campaigns, we provide graphical evidence of non-
negligible cyclical price increases around the time of democratic elections, at a worldwide
level. Finally, we show that during the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, changes in daily
state-level price fluctuations were significantly correlated to changes in the candidates win-
ning probabilities, as estimated using state-level election polls. We emphasize that, in our
empirical application, we can neither observe the total volume of political ads nor track the
number of ads visualized by a specific user. Hence, we cannot directly measure campaign in-
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tensity. However, for the reasons illustrated above, we know that an increase in competition
among bidders will affect prices for targeting a given audience. Thus, we base our measure
for intensity of Facebook political campaign on online ad prices.
Advertisers on Facebook compete for ad slots to target an audience. Facebook
offers multiple layers of targeting, so that the advertiser can direct their ads to their preferred
audiences. (Appendix A.1 gives more detail on the audience-selection procedures.) Once an
audience is selected, three metrics determine the price paid to the platform: cost-per-click
(CPC), cost-per-action (CPA) and cost-per-mile (CPM).13 Advertisers can pick the most
appropriate one, depending on their objective and business model. For conversion-oriented
objectives, such as subscriptions or retail sales, advertisers usually pay per click (CPC) or
per action (CPA), whereas for exposure objectives, such as political campaigns, advertisers
typically choose to pay for impressions (CPM). Once the bidding price is placed, Facebook
allocates ad spaces according to a mechanism based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction
(described in Appendix A.2).
To build our online advertising dataset, we scrape daily prices for U.S. state- and
ideology- specific audiences, during the three months preceding the 2016 U.S. presidential
election. We extract both CPM and CPC. We further condition on age bracket, gender, race,
or education.14 We use these data to measure the intensity of the online political campaign
during the election campaign, and its effects on voting outcome.There are few groups in the
area of Computer Science who have leveraged Facebook Marketing API data (in a completely
privacy-preserving manner) to address socio-economic problems, the main contributions to
13Cost-per-click (CPC) is the rate that websites charge advertisers every time someone clicks on an ad.
Cost-per-action (CPA)is the rate that websites charge advertisers every time a user clicks and takes a specific
action (such as page likes, video views, mobile app installs, etc.). Cost-per-mile (CPM) is a marketing term
used to denote the price of 1,000 advertisement impressions on one webpage. If a website publisher charges
$2.00 CPM, that means an advertiser must pay $2.00 for every 1,000 impressions of its ad. The “M” in CPM
represents the Roman numeral for 1,000.
14This means that our base audience will be, for example, Facebook users in Texas, who have been
identified to be conservative. Further narrowing of this audience would mean, for example, distinguishing
between female conservative users in Texas, or liberal users who live in California and have completed college.
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the literature have been discussed in the previous session. To use our data, we construct a
price index to account for a number of issues. First, online advertising prices are affected by
audience size and specificity. Keeping the number of advertisers constant, one can expect
the price of targeting an audience to be decreasing in the audience size (because of higher
supply), and increasing in its specificity (because the more narrowly defined the audience,
the more likely users in the audience are to match the advertiser’s ideal target). Since the
size of the audience matters for the bidding price, it is crucial to ensure that the number of
users matching a certain audience does not vary over our observational period. Second, we
need to account for the fact that a political profile can be correlated with certain consumer
preferences, and that non-political advertisers might participate bidding for the audience
with that same political profile for reasons unrelated to the electoral campaign. Notably,
recent research shows that digital footprints, such as Facebook “likes” are strongly correlated
with personal attributes and preferences (Kosinski et al., PNAS 2013); as a result, political
ideology can be exploited to identify individuals who are more likely to be interested in certain
goods and services. This limits comparability of price fluctuations across different audiences.
Finally, there is an issue of relevance of a given political profile in different contexts, and
at different points in time. Facebook users who fit a certain political profile could be key,
when located in certain geographical area, but not in others; think, for instance, of the
relevance of an ideologically “moderate” user in a swing state compared to the same user
in a safe partisan state. A user’s relevance might be affected by exit polls, or by exogenous
informational shocks (e.g., an event that shifts public opinion at large, such as a scandal).
We account for these issues by building a relative price index: the relative CPM
(psci). This index is given by normalizing the CPM of an audience located in a U.S. state
(s), with a specific demographic characteristic (c) and political ideology (i), , by the CPM
of the general audience located in the same U.S. state and with the same demographic
characteristic.
13
Relative CPM for audience defined by State (s) Characteristics (c) Political Ideology (i) :
psci =
Psci
Psc
(1)
The intuition behind this measure is that geographic location and demographic character-
istics can be used by all generic advertisers (G) to proxy for users’ preferences, whereas
ideology matters only to political advertisers, the candidates (C), who know what subset of
the population they need to convince in order to secure an electoral win. In other words,
conditional on a geographic location and a given set of demographic characteristics (e.g.,
women above 40 years of age, with a college degree, residing in New York),only political
candidates should be willing to pay the premium required to target the subset of users also
identified as having a certain political ideology.
Because political ideology is identified by Facebook through the user’s revealed
preferences (i.e.. profile characteristics, such as likes, education, profession, relationship
status, favorite movies, books, sports, places, etc.) and network, the political subsample
composition is rather time-invariant.15 This ensures that observed variation in our relative
price measure is not driven by variation in the number of users with a given political ideology
(see Figure 3), which rules out endogeneity of political ideology to the electoral campaign (at
least in the short term). We naturally observe that swing states have the majority of users
classified as moderate, whereas the safe Democrat and Republican states have the majority
of users classified as liberal and conservative, respectively. But we find no variation in the
number of users in each category over time.
To measure the way the campaign affects changes in respondents’ voting behavior,
15The Facebook audience defined on the basis of the users “behavior” displays much more variation over
time. That is because the “interest” of Facebook users on a specific topic varies, according to their actions,
such as clicking, commenting, liking, reading, watching posts.
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we also build an additional index, which captures the CPM price run-up over a given time
interval.
Relative CPM Run-up for audience defined by State (s) Characteristics (c) Political
Ideology (i), between Election Week (e) and Interview Week (w):
rscp,w =
pscp,e
pscp,w
(2)
The advantage of using this index is that, when assigned to a respondent of the
ANES political survey, it exploits the random assignment of the respondents to the date of
the interview, and the subsequent variation in exposure to the social media political cam-
paign. So, despite being unable to observe how many ads each respondent has visualized over
the time she spent on Facebook during the campaign, we can exploit the randomness of the
duration between two dates used to compare differences in the responses to voting questions.
3.2.1 Discussion and Some Illustrative Examples
Focusing on the U.S. market during the 2016 presidential campaign allows us to collect Face-
book ad prices that are specific to ideologically defined audiences. Exploring the variation
of these prices across audiences located in states that are more or less strategic for a given
candidate allows us to investigate the intensity of social media use for a specific campaign
strategy. We illustrate the intuition behind our approach with a visual example. Figure 5
shows average weekly relative CPM prices for Facebook online ads, targeted at audiences
identified by a geographic location and a political ideology, in the weeks preceding the 2016
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elections. We use relative CPM prices, to filter out state-level effects, which may possi-
bly be driven by confounding economic factors. In the example, the geographic location is
selected to be one of three states with rather consistent political alignment: New York, a
Democratic state; Florida, a swing state; and Texas, a Republican state.16 The figure sug-
gests that moderate voters (those with weak or unformed preference for a specific candidate)
have been aggressively targeted, and particularly so in swing states, rather than in partisan
states. At the same time, liberal voters are the most expensive to target in New York, and
the least expensive to target in Texas. This picture seems to tell a story that is very much
aligned with political economy theory: undecided voters in swing states are the most valu-
able voters, because obtaining their support can buy a candidate the electoral win; and, at
the same time, candidates focus on getting out the vote of their own supporters in partisan
states, to secure the expected results. By contrast, in states where the opposition party dom-
inates, candidates do not invest in attempts to flip support of moderate and partisan voters
aligned with the competing candidate, and they do not invest in get-out-the-vote campaigns.
3.3 Supporting Evidence on the link between Advertising Prices
and Political Contestability
We conduct two empirical exercises to show that our approach provides robust indicators for
the intensity of political campaigning through online advertising. The first exercise shows
that online ad prices follow the electoral cycle. The second exercise shows that there is a
significant correlation between fluctuations in online ad prices and changes in the winning
probabilities of political candidates.
16The political alignment of these states has remained constant since at least 1988 (see State Historical
Presidential Election Information from “270 to Win”, https://www.270towin.com/states/). Following
California, which has the largest population of any state, Texas, Florida and New York are the most populous
states in the country, ). These states also lists among the four most populated of the US.
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3.3.1 Online Ads Prices and Electoral Cycles around the World
For the first exercise we take a step back from the detailed analysis of the 2016 U.S. presiden-
tial election. We build a worldwide dataset, to show that our approach is not circumstantial
only to the U.S. context, but rather holds for all electoral cycles. We scrape country-specific
daily prices for a large set of 213 countries, during an interval of one-and-a-half years (from
July 2015 until February 2017). To identify the subset of democratic countries, where infor-
mation flow is not controlled or biased by authoritative governments, we refer to the ranking
provided by the Electoral Democracy Rating published by Freedom House. We select coun-
tries defined as “Free” or “Partly Free” that held democratic elections during the past five
years. This leaves us with a sample of 45 fair elections held during the time spanned by our
data.17 We use country-specific CPM as the measure of unit ad prices. We filter country
fixed effects, day-of-the-week cyclicalities, and time trends away from the raw price series,
and then normalize time around the election date of each country. We restrict the analysis to
a time window of 200 days before and after the election. Averaging by day across countries
allows us to assess whether Facebook prices grew worldwide around the time of a political
electoral campaign. As illustrated in Figure 4, average worldwide prices sharply rose during
the last two months before the elections (an average increase of around 50 USD cents, which
corresponds to about a 25 percent increase in prices), and steadily dropped over the three
months after the election date. After this five-month-long window, prices seem to have re-
turned to their equilibrium level. This is in line with the assumption that new advertisers
(the political candidates, C) enter the market with very aggressive campaigns immediately
before the elections, and then leave the market in the subsequent period. The fact that
17The average of a country/territory Political Rights and Civil Liberties ratings is called the Freedom
Rating, and it is this figure that determines the status of a country/territory as Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free
(3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0).
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prices drop more slowly than they rise is also consistent with the media frenzy typically
surrounding the first trimester of any newly elected government.
3.3.2 Candidates’ Popularity and Ads Prices during the 2016 US Presidential
Campaign
Having established that Facebook online ads do respond to the electoral cycle of democratic
countries, we proceed with a second exercise: to investigate whether fluctuations observed in
the prices of these ads can be used to measure changes in the political campaigns conducted
on the social media site. To this purpose, we return to the U.S. market alone. The reason
for this restriction is that U.S. users are the only ones for whom Facebook has started, since
2014, to classify political preferences. We look at the correlation between electoral winning
probabilities and online advertising prices. We base our test on the assumption that candi-
dates would adjust the intensity of their campaigns in order to respond to changes in their
estimated probability of winning the election. We collect daily state-specific winning proba-
bilities for both presidential candidates, during the three months preceding the election (from
the 8th of August, until the 8th of November 2016). Our source is the FiveThirthyEight 2016
Election Forecast, which published daily winning probabilities, estimated using a compre-
hensive model that accounts for the result of local state-level polls, as well as macroeconomic
trends and historical political outcomes.18 We then estimate a dynamic panel model, that
relates the daily CPM prices to the absolute value of the lagged difference among the winning
probabilities of the two candidates. The model is estimated using a generalized method of
moments (GMM) approach, and accounts for cyclical fluctuations in Internet usage (day-of-
18The website also computes winning probabilities simply based on local state-level polls. We repeated
our test using also this series, and found similar results.
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the-week dummies) and for a time trend (week-of- the-year dummies).19 The results from
this exercise show that, at the state level, daily Facebook ad prices are significantly affected
by changes in the winning probabilities of the two candidates. In fact, as shown in Table
1, CPM prices drop, as political competition between the two candidates falls, due to an
increase of Trump’s chances of winning the presidential election.
Insert Table 1 in about here
4 The Effect of Facebook on Political Behavior
The previous discussion shows that Facebook ad prices can be used to measure the intensity
of political campaigns. In fact, our data provides evidence that the social media platform
was largely employed during the 2016 US Presidential election. However, the question re-
mains of whether social media, in general, can be successfully used to affect voting behavior.
Our paper proceeds in this direction and combines online political campaigning data with
individual level information on turnout and voting outcomes. In studying the effectiveness of
online political advertising, we focus on the two recognized purposes of political campaigns:
mobilization and persuasion of voters.
A fundamental point is that analyzing the effect of political campaigns requires
to integrate our measure of social media campaign intensity with information on voters’
exposure to this novel media channel. This is because the overall effect of the campaign
depends on the “volume” of political messages directed to a specific audience, but also on
how much individuals of that audience are open to receive those information. To find a
19Our methodological approach draws from a literature on the effects of electoral forecasts and outcomes
on financial markets and stock prices. See Herron (2000) and Knight (2006) for the effect of winning
probabilities on stock returns, and Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and Sattler (2013) for the effect of
electoral outcomes. More recent studies are Girardi and Bowles (2018) and Wagner et al. (2017).
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measure of exposure to Facebook advertising, we collect information on individuals’ media
consumption. These are provided by the 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES),
among numerous other respondent characteristics. Our strategy consists in exploiting ide-
ological preferences, demographic characteristics and geographical location, to match each
ANES respondent to a Facebook online advertising audience. Survey questions on whether
the respondent uses social media networks, Facebook specifically, and on how frequently she
accesses political news on the platform are used to build a simple indicator of exposure.
Doing so, allows us to obtain the composite individual-level measure of treatment to the
political campaign, by interacting our audience specific proxy for intensity with individual
specific measure of Facebook exposure. Note that exposure is an individual level character-
istic, possibly dependent on the respondent exogenous preferences on media consumption.
Intensity, on the other hand, is an audience level characteristic, exogenous, because depen-
dent on the random assignment of survey respondents to their respective interview date. The
identification strategy for the effect of social media campaigning on voting behavior is based
on comparing Facebook users and non-users, conditional on the combined level of exposure
and intensity to the campaign. The next section describes in details the methodology we
employ.
4.1 Matching Facebook Audiences to Survey Respondents
The 2016 American National Election Study (ANES, 2017) provides individual responses
regarding social media and Facebook usage, as well as voting behaviors, political preferences,
demographic and economic characteristics for a sample of 2,414 American voters interviewed
before and after the 2016 US Presidential elections. Pre-election interviews are randomly
conducted during the two months prior to the 2016 elections and are followed by post-election
re-interviewing beginning November 9, 2016. Political ideology, demographic characteristics
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and geographical location, allows us to match each user to a specific audience, as defined
in our Facebook ads-price database. Date of interview, respondent’s state of residence,
political ideology, gender, education and age allow us to assign to each respondent the ad
price a political advertiser would have paid to target an audience made of subjects with
the same profile. The overall effect to online digital campaign for that respondent will
later be derived by the intensity of the online campaign during the period preceding or
following the interview date, conditional on her individual exposure to Facebook platform
as a mean to access campaign information. This makes it possible to compare different
respondents in different markets in terms of their relative exposure to different levels of
political campaigning. We focus on the effect of advertising exposure on voter turnout and
candidate choice.
Table 2 provides an example of difference in intensity of the campaigns targeted to
audiences specified by geographic location, ideology and gender. Comparing prices at the
interview date with prices at the election date, we see that the most intensive campaign is
always targeted at Moderate users. We also observe that campaign intensity was generally
higher for republican than for democrat voters. Finally, we find that when it comes to liberal
respondents, women were more intensively targeted than men, while the opposite holds for
conservative respondents.
Insert Table 2 in about here
From the inspection of Table 3, instead, we learn that of the 2,414 ANES respondents for
which we have information, nearly 30 percent of them does not use Facebook (note that the
site penetration rate for the US population was equal to 88.5% in 2016); of those who have
an account about 60 percent check political news on Facebook on a daily basis. Facebook
users are on average younger, more educated and in higher proportion male; politically they
appear to lean slightly more towards the left than non users. It is also interesting to note
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that over 17 percent of respondents admit during the first interview that they are not very
interested in politics because ”they haven’t thought very much about politics” . We assume
that the choice of having a Facebook account is exogenous to the choice of reading political
news on the social media (see Figure3, which shows that Facebook daily active users were
stable between the 1st of September and the 1st of December 2016, and that this trend was
constant across gender and ideology).
4.2 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
Our key explanatory variables combine measures of intensity and of exposure to Facebook
political campaigns, allowing for their effect to interact for all respondents included in the
2016 ANES sample. We propose two metrics for intensity: the Relative CPM, (psci), (INT-1 )
and the Relative CPM ratio (rsci,w) (INT-2 ), both measures have been discussed in Section
3.3 and are based on average CPM prices recorded in the week prior to the interview (psci) ,
and on prices recorded in the week prior to the election (rsci,w). Using a period of one week
is motivated by studies suggesting that individuals typically forget messages within a matter
of days (e.g., Gerber et al. 2011a; Hill et al. 2012; Patterson and McClure 1977; Sears and
Kosterman 1994). These measures differ by State, date of the interview and audience type.
Both indexes capture the intensity of the campaign but the second measure also takes into
account the trend of the campaign up to the election day; for example pscp measures the
ratio between the average CPM of Republican Women in Texas and the average CPM of
all Women in Texas, while rscp measures the run-up in pscp recorded between the election
week and the week before the first interview. So pscp,w captures campaign intensity, and rscp
captures both intensity and duration.
Individuals exposure to political information spread through Facebook, instead,
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depends on the frequency at which respondents use the social media platform. To construct
this measure, EXP, we combine the answers to two questions asked in the 2016 ANES sur-
vey: (i) whether or not the respondent has a Facebook account (”Do you have a Facebook
account used recently?”) and (ii) how many days a week the respondent uses social media
to learn about Presidential elections (from zero to seven). We set EXP equal to zero when
the respondent does not have a Facebook account or uses it only sporadically (up to twice a
week) and one if heavily relies on the social media for learning about the campaign. 20 The
interaction between EXP and INT provides a personalized measure of the overall individual
level intensity of the political campaign on Facebook. A caveat here, our measure does not
provide information on the content of the advert or on the identity of the advertiser. Liberini
et al (2018) look at this issue with an online experiment. The baseline model we estimate
for respondent i matching audience a, who was interviewed at time t , is as follows:
Yiat = αEXPi + βINTat + γEXPi × INTat + δXi +Da + iat (3)
We estimate this model for a number of different outcome variables, Y , measuring
voting behavior and participation. We consider, in turn, voter turnout, candidate choice, and
between pre-and-post elections interviews’ preference switch. Moreover all the regressions
include an additional set of controls, X, to take into account factors influencing political
behavior and preferences, and a set of ideology dummies Da, which account for time invariant
differences among the ideological audiences. The control variables are: gender, religion,
marital status, level of education, race, number of children income, home and gun ownership,
employment status, political orientation, intentions and participation in previous elections
as well as day of the week and month of the year of the pre-election interview. We also
include information on exposure to other media: television, press and Internet. We estimate
20We also experiment with a different variation for EXP, with the variable taking value of zero if the
respondent does not have or does not use a Facebook account and the values from 1 to seven depending on
the number of days a week the account is used to collect political information, the results are very similar
to those presented in the paper and can be seen upon request.
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this model using LPM. 21
One crucial contribution of our empirical analysis is that we are able to capture
different targeting dimensions of the campaign launched on social media. Our previous
discussion stressed how sophisticated micro-targeting represents the true advantage of con-
ducting political campaigns on online platforms versus traditional media. When estimating
the model in equation (3), we interchangeably use intensity measures based on targeting of
different types. In fact, INTat entirely depends on the definition of the audience, a. Specif-
ically, we always condition an audience on its geographic location (the state) and political
ideology. In addition, then, we allow the audience to also vary for one of these demographic
characteristics: gender, educational level, age and race.22 Comparing the performance of the
same model across intensity measures allow us to say something about the effectiveness of
targeting along these different dimensions. In fact, our first result is to show that campaign
intensity based on race and age targeting does not seem to have significant effect on any of
our outcome variables. On the contrary, campaign intensity based on gender or educational
level seem to be effective, to different extents, with all our outcome variables.
4.2.1 The Effect on Voter Turnout
One of the main questions the political economic literature has addressed is whether advertis-
ing helps persuade potential voters to go to the ballot. The results are mixed and have been
discussed in Section 2. As far as we are aware, our methodology contributes to this stream
of literature by providing the first evidence on how micro-targeted political advertising on
social media affects the likelihood to cast the ballot. We estimate variations of equation(3),
where the dependent variable is a dummy taking value of one if the respondent has voted in
the general election and zero otherwise. The full set of controls listed in the previous section
21Probit regressions produce nearly identical to OLS average marginal effect. Outputs are available upon
request.
22For identification purposes, we only consider one of these dimension at a time.
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are included in all our specifications23. The results for this exercise are displayed in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 in about here
The table is divided in two panels; to proxy for the intensity of the campaign, we employ
the relative CPM (INT − 1), in the top panel, and the relative CPM run-up (INT − 2), in
the second panel. In each column, we estimate the model using the CPM prices for different
targeting dimensions: by political ideology only, and by political ideology combined, in turn,
with gender, age, race and education. The overall result we observe from this table is that
turnout is negatively affected by political campaigns targeted at a combination of political
ideology and gender. Specifically, from the second column and first panel of the table, we
find a negative effect on turnout of exposure and intensity, when taken separately, but a
positive cumulative effect of the two, when interacted. This suggests that individuals who
access the social media on a daily basis are less likely to go to vote, compared to those who
do not have a Facebook account. Yet, the exposure effect is less negative, the higher the
intensity of the political campaign targeted at these users.
Insert Table 5 in about here
We now focus on the effect of gender-based micro-targeting on vote turnout (column 2,
Table 4). To give a more precise indication of the magnitude of the effects of intensity
and exposure to the social media political campaigns, we resort to a number of graphical
illustrations. Figure 9 shows the joint effect of accessing Facebook and being exposed to
campaigns of different intensity. The figure is a contour plot, with campaign intensity on
the horizontal axes and campaign exposure ( the number of days a week the respondent
reads about politics on Facebook) on the vertical axes. Different colors are associated with
23These are not reported in the tables and are available upon request
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different levels of the predicted probability of turnout, from blue (below 60 percent) to red
(close to 100 percent).
Insert Figure 9 in about here
The graph simply shows that for low and medium Facebook exposure, turnout drops as
campaign intensity increases. It seems, instead, that there is no significant effect of campaign
intensity on turnout for those people who access Facebook on a daily basis. These are
average effects, for the overall sample of respondents. Because we are interested in the effect
of micro-targeting, however, we expect these effects to be only relevant for the subgroups of
respondents that are the aim of the political campaign. If both candidates compete for a
State whose winning probability depends on turnout of men, for example, we expect to find
a significant effect of intensity on men, but not on women. Because the effective targeting
is based on gender and ideology, we re-estimate the model of column 2, table 4, for subsets
defined by gender, past vote outcome and current ideology. Results are displayed in table 5,
and show that the targeted campaign was effective for male (column 3), but not for female
(column 2) respondents, and it was effective for republican (column 8), but not for liberal or
neutral voters (columns 6 and 7, respectively). We also look at whether ideological target
might be based on past electoral preferences (i.e. voting outcomes in 2012), but find this not
to be the case (see columns 4 and 5 of table 5)24. For a quantitative interpretation of these
results, we look at the effects of campaign exposure and campaign intensity across gender
and ideology separately, in figures 10 and 11 respectively. The top part of each figure shows
trends in the predicted probability of turnout, for respondents who rarely use Facebook as
a media tool to access political news and for those who, instead, do so on a regular basis. In
the bottom part we test whether the difference in these predicted probabilities, conditional
on different levels of campaign intensity, is significantly different from zero. Figure 10 tells us
24We find that subgrouping respondents over their past voting preferences never yield significant targeting
effects, also for the other outcome variables considered in the analysis. These additional results are omitted
from the remainder of the paper, but are available upon request.
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that male respondents are less likely to turn out for elections, the more intense the political
campaign to get out their vote. However, this effect is much stronger for respondents who
rarely use Facebook, compared to those who use it on a regular basis. In fact, the bottom
plot tells us that for medium levels of campaign intensity (INTEN1 = 1.1), the mere fact
of using Facebook on a regular basis increases the predicted probability of turnout by 5
percentage point. These results do not hold for female respondents. Next, we look at the
differential effect of micro-targeting across subgroups defined by different political ideologies.
Consistently to results in column 6 of Table 5, we see in the top plot of Figure 10 that higher
campaign intensity levels correspond to lower turnout rates for all respondents, expect for
Republican voters who access Facebook on a regular basis. For these, at high levels of
campaign intensity, the difference between using Facebook rarely or on a regular basis can
result in between 5 and 10 percentage points difference in turnout rates. Note that our results
are consistent with the idea that Trump invested more in campaigning on social media and,
presumably, targeted his core supporters, i.e. men and conservatives. It is also interesting
to find that exposure to social media, per se, has a negative effect on turnout, which is in
line with findings by Falck et al. (2014).
4.2.2 Choice of the candidates
The next question we address is whether the Facebook campaign is more effective in moving
voters toward a specific candidate. Table 6 displays the results for the estimation of equation
(3), when the dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent voted for Trump and zero
otherwise. Table 8 repeats the analysis on the dependent variable collecting Clinton votes.
These tables have the same format of Table 4. We depart from our results on the vote for
the Republican candidate.
Insert Tables (6) and (7) in about here
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First, we are interested in understanding whether micro-targeting is equally successful, when
based on different personal characteristics. From an inspection of the table, we immediately
see that gender and educational level are two dimensions over which targeting seem to be
significantly effective, but that the same does not hold for targeting based on race and age.
We also find that the effects are significant when using the CPM ratio, which accounts for
both intensity and duration of the political campaign (bottom panel of table 6). Comparing
columns (2) and (5), bottom panel, we find that the direction of the effect is the same
across targeting dimensions, but the magnitude is higher for targeting based on ideology and
gender, versus ideology and educational level. Figure 12 allows us to interpret the results
from column (2). The figure is, again, a contour plot, showing the joint marginal effect of
campaign exposure (on the vertical axis) and intensity (on the horizontal axis). Individuals
who have no access to Facebook are decreasingly likely to cast their vote in favor of the
Republican candidate, as the campaign intensity targeted to an audience with their political
ideology and gender intensifies. Their predicted probability of supporting Trump goes from
0.5 to 0.15. On the other hand, this effect reverts as individuals become more exposed to
Facebook content, because they access the social media more often to read about political
news. Individuals who access Facebook on a daily basis are, in fact, more likely to vote for
the Republican candidate when the campaign intensifies, as their predicted probability of
supporting Trump goes from 0.3 to 0.46.
Insert Figure (12) in about here
To test whether these results hold for all targeted subgroups we proceed with the
same approach used to analyze the effect on turnout. In table 7, columns (2) and (3),
we re-estimate the model with gender and ideology targeting for the subgroups of famale
and male voters, respectively. In columns (4) to (6) we look at neutral, republican and
democrat voters. Finally, in columns (7) and (8), we re-estimate the model for education
and ideology targeting (table 6, column (5)), this time for the subgroups of voters with high
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or low educational levels25 .
When it comes to targeting based on the combination of gender and ideology, we
find large and significant effects for the group of neutral (uninterested and uninformed) vot-
ers (column (4)). The effects on the other ideologically identified groups are not significant.
We find large effects also for the subgroup of male voters, however these are weakly signif-
icant. Figures 13 and 14 help us interpret the effects of the model’s interaction terms for
these alternative subgroups of respondents. Figure 13 shows that a common trend is that
respondents targeted by highly intensive campaigns are less likely to cast their vote in favour
of the Republican candidate. Male respondents who use Facebook on a regular basis are the
only subgroup for which this trend is reverted, but the difference with the effect for male
respondents who never use Facebook is not statistically significant. The bottom right plot
shows that there is some significant difference between the support for Trump among women
who use Facebook daily and those who don’t. For medium level of campaign intensity, this
difference being approximately equal to 2 percentage points.
From figure 14, top graph, we see that, while partisan voters are hardly affected by
exposure to the social media, neutral voters who access Facebook on a daily basis are up to
twice more likely to support the Republican candidates than neutral voters who do not have
a Facebook account. The bottom graph shows that for high levels of campaign intensity,
neutral voters who are exposed to Facebook on a daily basis are up to 5 percentage points
more likely to cast their vote in favor of Trump. A possible explanation could be that
individuals who rarely use Facebook are exposed to alternative forms of campaign, which
are possibly effective in convincing voters against choosing Trump. Online micro-targeted
politics do very little for partisan voters.
Insert Figures ?? and ?? in about here
25These are defined by the highest educational level attained at the time of the interview. Respondents
are divided between those who have at least a college degree (high) and those who have attained only lower
educational levels (low)
29
Finally, we turn to the effect of targeting based on education and ideology. Columns
(7) and (8) from table 7 tell us that there is a significant effect on subgroups of voters with
low- and high- educational levels. These effects have the same sign, but they are much
stronger for the former, than for the latter group. Figure 15 graphically represents these
results. The top graph shows that for voters who rarely access Facebook the predicted
probability of supporting Trump is orthogonal to the educational level. At the same time,
this probability displays a mirroring trend, for respondents with low education who access
Facebook on a daily basis. The bottom graph indicates that, for respondents who achieved
less than a college degree, accessing Facebook on a regular basis, versus not using it as a
tool to gather political news, can explain up to ten percentage points in the support for the
Republican candidate.
These results are consistent with the idea that Trump concentrated his targeting
effort both on voters who are male, and who are not particularly interested in politics. both
categories were naturally key to the candidate’s support base, particularly so for the neutral
voters, who were by nature more likely to swing their vote in favor of a persuading politician.
There might have also been some targeting based on voters educational level, and it is again
not surprising that the low educated voters are the more responsive to the type of political
advertising typically displayed on social media. This is also consistent with previous findings
showing that the effects of advertising are conditional on having differential impact on voters
depending on their level of political knowledge and sophistication (Huber and Arceneaux,
(2007); Ridout and Franz, (2011); Zaller, (1992) ).
What is particularly interesting is that all these results are exclusive to the vote
casted in favor of the Republican candidate. We repeat the whole analysis for the Clinton
vote, and surprisingly we find that micro-targeting had no significant effect. As shown in
table 8, this is true for all types of targeting, and holds for subgroups of voters (table 9).
Figure 16 graphically confirms these findings. The only positive significant effect, as shown
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in figure 17, is that on democrat voters. We find that the average predicted probability of
casting a vote for the Democrat candidate increases with campaign intensity for the democrat
voters who do not have access to the social media platform, and decreases for those who
daily gather political news on it. This effect is not very significant, however it is interesting
to see that it mirrors what we had found for Trump.
4.3 Political Behavior Changes: Political Polarization vs Informa-
tion
As highlighted in Section 2, recent studies have linked the rise of political polarization to
the growing use of social media as a vector to convey political messages. It is debated that
political micro-targeting may have substantially contributed to this phenomenon. Contrary
to traditional media outlets (such as TV, radio, printed press), Facebook is not subject to any
regulation on advertising for political campaigns. So targeted voters may be discriminated,
or simply be unaware of being the target of political advertising, which comes presented as
legitimate news and, as a consequence, may give distorted, biased, or even fake, information.
As a possible consequence voters may be ”trapped” in filter bubbles, receive less varied
content and ultimately lose the ability to critically process information. This might, in turn,
make them more unlikely to change their initial voting choices, and possibly make them
more sensitive to extreme ideologies (echo-chambers).
To investigate this hypothesis, we would need to observe advertising content, and
gradual changes in respondents political alignment. These information are unobserved (to
the econometrician), and can hardly be approximated. Nevertheless, with our data we can
make a first step toward investigating this hypothesis. We can simply analyze and compare
Facebook users and non-users’ change in voting strategies that may take place during the
window between the pre-election interview and the actual vote. If the hypothesis is that
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frequent exposure to political news delivered on social media, increases polarization (due to
the effect of echo chambers), then we should find that Facebook (regular) users who are highly
targeted by political campaigns are less likely to revise their initial voting choices during the
electoral campaign, than similar voters who do not use their Facebook account. The time
between the interview date and the election identifies a (randomly assigned) window during
which candidates are exposed to the “treatment” of online political advertising.
We calculate the probability of changing political preferences by estimating equa-
tion(3), where our dependent variable is a zero-one-dummy calculated on the basis of the
difference between respondent’s voting intention and actual vote in the 2016 election.
Insert Table (10) in about here
Table 10) shows that, again, targeting down the lines of gender and education, jointly with
ideology, is an effective way to anchor voters to their initial voting choice. If we look at the
results displayed both in columns two and five of the table we can see that those voters, who
are highly targeted on the basis not only of their political preferences but also on their gender
and education and consistently rely on Facebook for information, are less likely to change
their mind compared to those who are not. Also note that reading the news on Facebook per
se , as well as being a political target per se both marginally affect vote change in a positive
way. We proceed our analysis by plotting the effect of gender-based micro-targeting on vote
change.
Insert Figure (18 ) in about here
The inspection of the plots in Figure 18 confirms that there is a strong difference between the
behavior of Facebook users and non-users, when they are treated with high level of campaign
intensity. When the fight on the political campaign battle field is more intense, an increase
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in exposure is associated with a decrease in the probability of changing the initial political
view.
Insert Table (11), in about here
Moving to the effect of micro-targeting on specific audiences we re-estimate equation(3) dif-
ferentiating across genders, political interests and level of educations. Interesting Table (11)
shows that there is a divide in the effects of vote change across groups in term of the gender,
ideology and education.
Insert Figure 19, in about here
We explore this further with the help of Figure19 and Figure20; motivated by results dis-
played in Table (11) we define the audiences by gender and ideology. Figure19 looks at
gender differences, from the inspection of the top panel of Figure19 it emerges that men
relying on Facebook for information, when are treated by low intensity campaign (i.e. for
level of intensity aroun one and below) are about five percent likely to switch their initial
voting choices but, when subject to high campaign intensity, they do almost entirely stuck to
their initial choice. For women we observe the same trend but this is much steeper and less
significant. The figures in the bottom panel show that for low intensity campaign Facebook
users change their opinion more than non-users and that this trend is reversed and widened
for high intensity campaign. The plots also show that this effect is stronger and more sig-
nificant for man. It is also to look at the distribution of intensity across gender, overall men
appear to have been higher targeted than women as the bar charts at the bottom of the
graphs show.
Insert Figure 20, in about here
Finally we investigate patterns in the behaviors of Facebook users and non-user with
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respect to their political views and the level of education with the aid of figure 20, reporting
the difference in the predicted marginal effects between users and non-users. Inspecting
the top panel of the figure, we can infer that the difference in the probability of switching
between the two groups due to reading political ads on the social media drastically goes
down with campaign intensity for Republican users, the effect is similar but weaker and less
significant for moderate voters, no effect at all is registered for Democrat voters instead.
From the comparison of the bar charts reported at the bottom of the graphs we can
deduce that politically uninterested/ moderates and Republicans were subjected to slightly
higher targeting that democrats. Form the bottom panel we can observe again a reduction
in the probability of changing mind for Facebook users compared to non-users among voters
who did not go to college or university, no effect for those with a degree instead. So education
matters too. While for people with a college or university degree reading political news on
Facebook does not change the likelihood to revise their views, been less educated and largely
relying on Facebook for information reduced the probability of change voting preferences
when being highly targeted of at least five percentage points. Comparing the distribution of
the intensity across groups along the level of education line we can clearly see that individuals
without a university degree were subject overall by higher targeting compared to those with
a degree, which may shed light on politicians targeting strategies. This is consistent with
the conjecture that political campaigns were largely fought among less educated or informed
and this may have had an impact on voting choices in the direction consistent with political
polarization.
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4.3.1 Media and Political Knowledge
To understand the channels through which reading news on Facebook reduces the likelihood
to change individuals’ initial voting strategies we need to understand how Facebook oper-
ates to affect this behavior. One possibility is that those who are constantly keeping up with
the political news on the social media may become better informed compared to those who
do not. In this case, it is possible that Facebook users, if more knowledgeable than their
counterparts, are more difficult to persuade to change their political positions. This is an
hypothesis that we can test by exploiting questions from the pre- and post- election surveys,
aiming to assess respondent political knowledge. During the first interview respondents are
asked ”For how many years is a senator elected?”, ”Which is the program for which the
Fed Government spend most?”, ”Which is the party with most members in the House be-
fore elections?, ”Which is the party with most members in the Senate before elections?”.
26 During the post-election survey they are asked to “. . . recall the office of: Joe Biden,
Paul Ryan, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin?, Justice Roberts?”. 27 So we take the ratio of
the number of correct post-election answers over the number of correct pre-election as an
indicator (albeit a bit crude one) of political knowledge improvement, PolKnow, and we
estimate the following model
Pol − knowiat = ωEXPi + φINTat + χEXPi × INTat + piTVi
+ λNewsi + φTalki + θInterneti + ζRadioi + uiat (4)
Where TV , News, Talk, Internet and Radio are dummies taking values of 1 if the respon-
26These are questions V161513, V161514,V161515,V161515 in ANES(2017)
27 Answers: Vice-President Biden, Speaker of the House Ryan, Chancellor of Germany Merkel,President
of Russia Putin,US Supreme Ct Chief Justice Roberts .
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dent use either of these platforms to learn about the elections. In all our specifications we
also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012 Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election,
party registration, vote at the Primary, gender, religion, age, marital status, education, race,
children, employment status, home ownership and gun ownership and we include Income
Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly FE. Where ω, φ,χ, pi λ, φ θ ζ are the
parameters to estimate and u is the error term.
Insert Table (12), in about here
The result for this exercise are displayed in Table12; in the first column we ignore the
interaction between exposure and intensity and we only include EXP as a regressor to
control the effect of Facebook, we then augment this basic specification with various measures
for INT and its interaction with EXP . From the inspection of the table it appears quite
clearly that reading about the political campaign on Facebook does not improve respondents’
knowledge about politics, the same results for radio, television and talk shows. A positive
effect on political knowledge comes from using Internet and reading newspapers instead.
In summary, our results suggest quite clearly that becoming more knowledgeable is
not the key to understand why Facebook people are less likely to change their mind and are
glued to their initial decisions. Political polarization at this stage may be the more obvious
answer, but a deeper understanding of what is going on on this front goes beyond the scope
of this paper and is left to future research.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has looked at the role played by social media, and in particular Facebook, in
shaping political campaign and affecting election outcomes. The logic behind our arguments
relies on the fact that social media exploit extensive quantities of user-generated data, which
can be used to help politicians personalize their election campaigns and to target with in-
creasing precision those voters who may be decisive in determining the outcomes of elections.
There is already evidence that this new way of campaigning may have large, and
possibly unwanted, consequences on election results and on the functioning of our demo-
cratic institutions, as the rise of a new wave of populism across the western world suggests,
especially in the absence of any regulations in the same way that old media outlets are.
The center piece of our paper is bringing into use a new and unique dataset which allow us
to assess the effects and the power of political “micro-targeting” by using daily Facebook
advertising prices, collected during the course of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign to
exploit the variation across political ideologies, and to propose a measure for the intensity
of online political campaigns. We then employ this novel measure to investigate two funda-
mental questions: (i) To what extent did political campaigns use the social media platform
micro-target voters? and (ii) How large was the effect, if any, of such campaigns on voters
who relied on social media to access political news?.
Our results indicate that Facebook matters and advertising was and effective way
in persuading Republican and moderate supporters to go to vote, and in swaying their
votes towards Trump. Users that are exposed to highly intensive political campaigns, and
who do not hold a college degree, are also persuaded to support the Republican candidate.
Interestingly, our results show that Clinton also failed to convince her natural core voters
to increase their support or participation in the elections. This is consistent with the claim
that Trump invested in Facebook as a campaign vehicle considerably more than Clinton
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or that his messages were better designed. Our results also indicated that learning about
politics on Facebook does not make voters more politically informed but make them less
likely to update their voting choices, which is consistent with political polarization. This
effect is particularly strong for men, Republican voters and less educated individuals, which
are possibly easier to ”capture”.
This paper constitutes one of the first attempts to shed light on how social media
can affect politics. We do believe that our measures of intensity represents a step forward in
advancing knowledge. Of course, this measure is not perfect, for example the content of the
online messages or the identity of who pays for the ads are not observed by us; so for these
reasons we are only able to observe the net outcomes of political campaigning. However
we resort to a revealed preference argument, to describe the political strategy that might
explain the patterns found in the variation of intensity of political campaign on the social
media platform. Given the role that some audiences have in specific states (e.g. moderate
voters in swing states), we can infer which political candidates would be willing to compete
to secure the votes of these audiences. There still a lot to be done but this can be left to
future research.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Candidates Winning Probabilities and CPM Prices
Dep. Variable: Republican Democrat Swing
Relative CPM Partisan States Partisan States States
Median States States
Lag of CPM median 0.533 0.545 0.502
(0.031)** (0.026)** (0.042)**
Abs. Value of Difference in Winning Prob -2.887 5.814 1.687
(0.640)** (0.907)** (0.508)**
Abs. Value of Difference in Winning Prob ×1[T > C] -2.390
(0.921)**
Note: results are based on the panel of state daily CPM prices, for the three months preceding
the 2016 Presidential elections. The estimated equation is cpms,t = αcpms,t−1 + β1PDIFFs,t−1 +
β2(PDIFFs,t−1 × TADVs,t−1) + es,t with PDIFFs,t = |(P Ts,t − PCs,t)|, and P Ts,t and P Ts,t indicate the
winning probability of Trump and Clinton, respectively . TADVs,t is an indicator variable with value
1 for all cases where Trump has the lead on the election forecast. A GMM one-step estimator was
used, with a restricted number of 2 lags of the dependent variable, as well as of the predetermined
and endogenous variables for use as instruments. Number of Observations is 1,977 for Republican
Partisan States, 1,376 for Democrat and 859 for Swing States. State grouping is based on historical
election results.
Table 2: Political Microtargeting by State/Ideology/Gender
Price Ratio between Interview and Election
Political Ideology Male Female
Liberal - very strong 0.988 0.990
Liberal - strong 0.978 0.986
Liberal - mild 0.977 0.978
Moderate 1.041 1.004
Conservative - mild 1.024 1.001
Conservative - strong 1.029 1.004
Conservative - very strong 1.013 1.003
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Table 3: The sample of Facebook users and non-users
Variable No Facebook Facebook Users
Freq. Mean Freq. Mean
Turnout Intention 989 0.934 1,425 0.940
Turnout (Effective) 871 0.873 1,233 0.862
Clinton Vote Intention 997 0.450 1,430 0.469
Clinton Vote (Effective) 994 0.427 1,428 0.438
Trump Vote Intention 997 0.384 1,430 0.341
Trump Vote (Effective) 994 0.383 1,428 0.349
Democrat 997 0.472 1,430 0.504
Swing 997 0.109 1,430 0.095
Republican 997 0.418 1,430 0.401
Female 997 0.444 1,430 0.591
Age 997 55.580 1,430 46.071
Degree 997 0.538 1,430 0.610
White Resp. 997 0.713 1,430 0.760
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Table 4: The effect of Facebook on Voter Turnout
Targeting Type: Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology
only & Gender & Age & Race & Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) 0.0251 -0.237** 0.0628 -0.0454 0.0468
(0.108) (0.107) (0.0873) (0.108) (0.220)
Relative CPM (Intensity 1 ) -0.0945 -0.209** -0.0623 -0.131 0.00858
(0.0881) (0.0834) (0.0563) (0.0858) (0.151)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM -0.0331 0.209** -0.0686 0.0324 -0.0562
(0.0994) (0.0986) (0.0792) (0.0998) (0.205)
Internet Access 0.0238 0.0210 0.0245 0.0235 0.0531
(0.0430) (0.0427) (0.0428) (0.0429) (0.0663)
R2 0.176 0.178 0.177 0.177 0.228
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) -0.0988 -0.224 0.0188 -0.254 -0.212
(0.157) (0.174) (0.129) (0.160) (0.310)
CPM Price Ratio (Intensity 2 ) 0.105 -0.171 -0.0790 -0.0601 0.0198
(0.118) (0.127) (0.0757) (0.117) (0.211)
News Access on FCBK x CPM Price Ratio 0.0814 0.199 -0.0272 0.226 0.184
(0.143) (0.162) (0.118) (0.147) (0.286)
Internet Access 0.0213 0.0246 0.0246 0.0244 0.0527
(0.0429) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0429) (0.0661)
R2 0.177 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.229
Observations 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 1,059
Note: Top panel uses Relative CPM, as measured during the week of the Interview. Bottom Panel uses Ratio of Relative CPM during
Election Week to Relative CPM during Interview Week. All specifications include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly
FE. They also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012 Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party registration, vote at the
Primary, gender, religion, age, marital status, education, race, children, employment status, home ownership and gun ownership.
Table 5: Heterogeneous effect on Voter Turnout
All Female Male Democrat Uninterested Republican 2012 Democrat 2012 Republican
Voters Voters Voters & Moderate Voters Voters Voters
Voters
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) -0.237** -0.0704 -0.416** -0.156 -0.300 -0.281* -0.256 -0.167
(0.107) (0.137) (0.186) (0.190) (0.227) (0.159) (0.167) (0.158)
Relative CPM (Intensity 1 ) -0.209** -0.227 -0.405*** -0.0511 -0.296* -0.191 -0.295** -0.0371
(0.0834) (0.141) (0.157) (0.158) (0.175) (0.126) (0.130) (0.125)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM 0.209** 0.0847 0.349** 0.146 0.243 0.279** 0.227 0.127
(0.0986) (0.124) (0.173) (0.183) (0.209) (0.138) (0.160) (0.137)
Internet Access 0.0210 0.00537 0.0131 0.138 -0.0519 0.118 0.0291 0.106
(0.0427) (0.0541) (0.0743) (0.111) (0.0596) (0.0864) (0.0567) (0.0764)
Observations 2,422 1,284 1,138 691 917 807 1,166 784
R-squared 0.178 0.210 0.222 0.251 0.236 0.239 0.175 0.205
Note: Intensity is measured as Ratio of Relative CPM during Election Week to Relative CPM during Interview Week. All specifications
include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly FE. They also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012
Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party registration, vote at the Primary, gender, religion, age, marital status, education, race, children,
employment status, home ownership and gun ownership.
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Table 6: The Effect of Facebook on Trump Vote
Targeting Type: Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology
only & Gender & Age & Race & Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) 0.0275 -0.125 0.0990 -0.0289 -0.207
(0.121) (0.122) (0.0991) (0.123) (0.223)
Relative CPM (Intensity 1 ) -0.0323 -0.157 0.0874 -0.0724 -0.0700
(0.100) (0.0958) (0.0585) (0.100) (0.162)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM 0.000553 0.142 -0.0650 0.0531 0.205
(0.113) (0.114) (0.0886) (0.116) (0.208)
Internet Access 0.0233 0.0212 0.0231 0.0234 0.0161
(0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0631)
R2 0.536 0.537 0.537 0.536 0.558
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) -0.169 -0.378** 0.0518 -0.172 -0.775**
(0.171) (0.186) (0.141) (0.182) (0.346)
CPM Price Ratio (Intensity 2 ) -0.218* -0.284** -0.0164 -0.173 -0.590**
(0.127) (0.128) (0.0830) (0.131) (0.259)
News Access on FCBK x CPM Price Ratio 0.182 0.379** -0.0219 0.186 0.729**
(0.157) (0.174) (0.129) (0.169) (0.319)
Internet Access 0.0269 0.0253 0.0235 0.0256 0.0253
(0.0435) (0.0431) (0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0635)
R2 0.537 0.537 0.536 0.537 0.560
Observations 2,421 2,421 2,421 2,421 1,059
Note: Top panel uses Relative CPM, as measured during the week of the Interview. Bottom Panel uses Ratio of Relative CPM during
Election Week to Relative CPM during Interview Week. All specifications include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly
FE. They also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012 Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party registration, vote at the
Primary, gender, religion, age, marital status, education, race, children, employment status, home ownership and gun ownership.
Table 7: Heterogeneous Effect on Trump Vote
All Sample Female Male Uninterseted & Repubblican Democrat Voters with Voters with
Voters Voters Uninfornmed Voters Voters High Low
Voters Education Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) -0.378** -0.287 -0.508* 0.0503 -0.715** 0.0551 -1.953** -0.457
(0.186) (0.268) (0.281) (0.162) (0.351) (0.375) (0.780) (0.432)
Relative CPM (Intensity 1 ) -0.284** -0.353 -0.182 -0.0598 -0.496** -0.0498 -0.653 -0.667*
(0.128) (0.224) (0.207) (0.116) (0.218) (0.271) (0.465) (0.341)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM 0.379** 0.320 0.475* -0.0425 0.707** -0.0186 1.847** 0.430
(0.174) (0.249) (0.264) (0.153) (0.328) (0.344) (0.723) (0.399)
Internet Access 0.0253 0.0157 0.00153 0.0209 -0.0241 0.136 0.00751 0.0221
(0.0431) (0.0523) (0.0748) (0.0311) (0.0613) (0.0933) (0.0961) (0.106)
Observations 2,417 1,282 1,135 691 914 806 275 782
R-squared 0.537 0.576 0.536 0.279 0.428 0.382 0.642 0.588
Note: Intensity is measured as Ratio of Relative CPM during Election Week to Relative CPM during Interview Week. All specifications
include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly FE. They also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012
Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party registration, vote at the Primary, gender, religion, age, marital status, education, race, children,
employment status, home ownership and gun ownership.
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Table 8: The Effect of Facebook on Clinton Vote
Targeting Type: Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology
only & Gender & Age & Race & Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) -0.0472 -0.124 0.0282 -0.0741 0.410*
(0.121) (0.110) (0.101) (0.119) (0.216)
Relative CPM (Intensity 1 ) -0.0741 -0.117 -0.144** -0.117 0.165
(0.0963) (0.0835) (0.0653) (0.0938) (0.159)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM 0.0137 0.0851 -0.0572 0.0388 -0.403**
(0.111) (0.0995) (0.0931) (0.109) (0.202)
Internet Access 0.0536 0.0515 0.0546 0.0533 0.112*
(0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0411) (0.0416) (0.0585)
R2 0.557 0.557 0.559 0.557 0.586
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) -0.0337 0.183 0.174 -0.162 0.626*
(0.175) (0.180) (0.149) (0.177) (0.347)
CPM Price Ratio (Intensity 2 ) 0.291** 0.0763 -0.0699 0.152 0.450*
(0.129) (0.131) (0.0883) (0.127) (0.251)
News Access on FCBK x CPM Price Ratio 0.00127 -0.201 -0.189 0.120 -0.599*
(0.161) (0.167) (0.135) (0.163) (0.319)
Internet Access 0.0475 0.0528 0.0557 0.0514 0.105*
(0.0417) (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0416) (0.0594)
R2 0.558 0.557 0.558 0.557 0.586
Observations 2,417 2,417 2,417 2,417 1,057
Note: Top panel uses Relative CPM, as measured during the week of the Interview. Bottom Panel uses Ratio of Relative CPM during Election
Week to Relative CPM during Interview Week. All specifications include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly FE. They
also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012 Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party registration, vote at the Primary, gender,
religion, age, marital status, education, race, children, employment status, home ownership and gun ownership.
Table 9: Heterogenous Effect of Facebook on Clinton Vote
All Low High Democrat Uninterested Republican
Education Education Voters & Moderate Voters
Voters
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) 0.626* 1.009 0.559 1.476** 0.403 0.0599
(0.347) (0.719) (0.440) (0.736) (0.637) (0.642)
Relative CPM (Intensity 1 ) 0.450* 0.400 0.411 1.265* 0.384 0.118
(0.251) (0.419) (0.329) (0.648) (0.438) (0.447)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM -0.599* -0.954 -0.537 -1.428** -0.373 -0.0513
(0.319) (0.670) (0.403) (0.684) (0.584) (0.600)
Internet Access 0.105* 0.00269 0.205** 0.499** 0.0822 0.117
(0.0594) (0.0856) (0.0845) (0.223) (0.0811) (0.0774)
Observations 1,057 275 782 261 444 349
R-squared 0.586 0.688 0.618 0.606 0.586 0.595
Note: Intensity is measured as Relative CPM, as measured during the week of the Interview, based on political
and education targeting. All specifications include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly
FE. They also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012 Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party
registration, vote at the Primary, gender, religion, age, marital status, education, race, children, employment
status, home ownership and gun ownership.
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Table 10: Effect of Facebook on Change in Voter Behaviour
Targeting Type: Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology
only & Gender & Age & Race & Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) 0.0299 0.0440 -0.0353 0.00503 0.0140
(0.0482) (0.0518) (0.0368) (0.0521) (0.0954)
Relative CPM (Intensity 1 ) 0.0191 0.0444 0.00579 0.0239 0.0288
(0.0382) (0.0413) (0.0295) (0.0386) (0.0740)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM -0.0259 -0.0389 0.0345 -0.00282 -0.0162
(0.0437) (0.0484) (0.0338) (0.0485) (0.0895)
Internet Access -0.0487** -0.0480* -0.0489** -0.0485** -0.0733*
(0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0385)
R2 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.145
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) 0.0430 0.227** 0.0646 -0.0250 0.340***
(0.0652) (0.0889) (0.0598) (0.0686) (0.128)
CPM Price Ratio (Intensity 2 ) -0.0246 0.140** 0.0447 -0.0284 0.140
(0.0465) (0.0578) (0.0482) (0.0511) (0.0992)
News Access on FCBK x CPM Price Ratio -0.0379 -0.210** -0.0575 0.0251 -0.317***
(0.0595) (0.0834) (0.0555) (0.0642) (0.120)
Internet Access -0.0480* -0.0494** -0.0485** -0.0481* -0.0755**
(0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0383)
R2 0.068 0.071 0.068 0.068 0.150
Observations 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 1,059
Note: Top panel uses Relative CPM, as measured during the week of the Interview. Bottom Panel uses Ratio of Relative CPM during Election
Week to Relative CPM during Interview Week. All specifications include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly FE. They
also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012 Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party registration, vote at the Primary, gender,
religion, age, marital status, education, race, children, employment status, home ownership and gun ownership.
Table 11: Heterogeneous Effect on Change in Voters Behaviour
All Sample Female Male Democrat Uninterested& Republican Voters with Voters with
Voters Voters Voters Uninformed Voters No University
Voters Degree Degree
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) 0.227** 0.153 0.293** 0.0602 0.214 0.348** 0.514 0.303*
(0.0889) (0.127) (0.129) (0.0808) (0.187) (0.151) (0.418) (0.161)
Relative CPM (Intensity 2 ) 0.140** 0.211* 0.0214 -0.0327 0.209** 0.217* 0.0245 0.254*
(0.0578) (0.109) (0.0727) (0.0613) (0.106) (0.119) (0.221) (0.145)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM -0.210** -0.151 -0.267** -0.0509 -0.209 -0.317** -0.445 -0.291*
(0.0834) (0.118) (0.122) (0.0729) (0.175) (0.140) (0.386) (0.154)
Internet Access -0.0494** -0.0633* 0.000110 0.0181 -0.0655* -0.00887 0.00799 -0.194**
(0.0246) (0.0339) (0.0303) (0.0151) (0.0359) (0.0462) (0.0301) (0.0833)
R2 0.071 0.138 0.121 0.157 0.154 0.221 0.476 0.197
Observations 2,422 1,284 1,138 691 917 807 275 784
Note: Intensity is measured as Ratio of Relative CPM during Election Week to Relative CPM during Interview Week. All specifications
include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly FE. They also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012
Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party registration, vote at the Primary, gender, religion, age, marital status, education, race, children,
employment status, home ownership and gun ownership.
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Table 12: Effect of Facebook on Information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
None Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology Political Ideology
Only & Gender & Race & Age & Education
News Access on FCBK (Exposure) 0.00996* 0.0249 0.0295 -0.0805* -0.0120 -0.0450
(0.00592) (0.0659) (0.0640) (0.0484) (0.0682) (0.131)
Relative CPM (Intensity 2 ) 0.372 0.00297 -0.251 0.436 0.330
(0.290) (0.284) (0.182) (0.304) (0.681)
News Access on FCBK x Relative CPM -0.0208 -0.0255 0.0759* 0.0133 0.0448
(0.0610) (0.0597) (0.0438) (0.0634) (0.120)
TV 0.0313 0.0152 0.0161 0.0166 0.0154 0.0631
(0.0508) (0.0467) (0.0467) (0.0467) (0.0467) (0.0770)
Newspapers 0.00873 0.0570* 0.0548* 0.0551* 0.0561* 0.0975*
(0.0359) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0549)
TalkShows 0.00193 0.0273 0.0282 0.0273 0.0269 -0.00579
(0.0399) (0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0363) (0.0614)
Internet 0.0967** 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.0418
(0.0419) (0.0381) (0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0611)
Radio -0.0202 -0.00338 -0.00491 -0.00275 -0.00338 0.0493
(0.0376) (0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0569)
Observations 2,191 2,191 2,191 2,191 2,191 938
Note: Top panel uses Relative CPM, as measured during the week of the Interview. Bottom Panel uses Ratio of Relative CPM during
Election Week to Relative CPM during Interview Week. All specifications include Income Class FE, State FE, Day of Week FE and Weekly
FE. They also control for Political Ideology, Turnout at the 2012 Elections, Vote at the 2012 Election, party registration, vote at the
Primary, gender, religion, age, marital status, education, race, children, employment status, home ownership and gun ownership.
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A Appendix
A.1 Selection of Targeted Audience
Advertisers on Facebook compete for ad slots to the desired audience. Facebook offers mul-
tiple layers of targeting, so that the advertiser can direct their ads to the exact audience that
maximizes the return on their investment. Figure 21 shows images of the Audience Selection
Dashboard available to Facebook Advertisers. Audiences can be chosen by a number of
criteria, among which 1) geographical location and 2) political ideology. Once the audience
is selected, Facebook indicates the number of active users and a range of prices (minimum,
median and maximum) corresponding to a spectrum of bids that are winning auctions in real
time to reach the same audience. Note that political ideology falls under the “Demograph-
ics” characteristics, in the Facebook audience selection criteria. This means that political
alignment is determined on the basis of users activity on the site, and it is rather constant
over time. It depends on pages liked, political preferences stated in the profile, but also on
the average political alignment of those who like the same pages of the user. There are two
ways to pay for ads, depending on the objective of the campaign: for conversion-oriented
objectives advertisers usually pay per click (CPC) or per action (CPA)28, whereas for expo-
sure objectives, like political campaigns, advertisers choose to pay for impressions (CPM).
We scrape Daily Prices for State/Ideology specific Audiences. We extract both CPM and
CPC. We further do this for Age, Gender, Race and Education State/Ideology specific au-
diences. Once the bids are placed, Facebook allocates ad spaces according to a mechanism
based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction described below.
28CPC stands for cost-per-click. This is the rate that websites charge advertisers every time someone
clicks on an ad. CPA stands for cost-per-action. This is the rate that websites charge advertisers every time
a user clicks and does a specific action (such as page likes, video views, mobile app installs, etc.).
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Figure 21: Facebook Audience Selection Dashboard
A.2 Auctions for Advertising on Facebook
To allocate advertising opportunities on its website, Facebook adopts an auction system
based on the Vickrey-Groves-Clark (VCG) mechanism. We briefly present this mechanism
(in an informal way), and discuss the implications for our analysis. Consider an auction
where a set of goods is being sold. In the case of Facebook, these goods correspond to
advertising space on the “wall” of a set of users defined by certain characteristics (e.g., de-
mographics, interests, etc.), i.e. an audience. For each of these goods, bidders (advertisers)
announce the maximum price they are willing to pay. Bidders cannot see other people’s bids
(sealed-bid auction). The auction closes once all the bids are in.
In the standard VCG auction, the auctioneer considers all bids and calculates for each the
marginal loss to the other bidders if the bid were successful. For those who would have
obtained the goods if the bid in question were ignored, the loss is equal to the bid they
placed (i.e., their declared willingness to pay). The loss is instead zero to all bidders who
would not have obtained the good, even if the bid considered were ignored. The auctioneer
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allocates the good to the highest bidders and charges them the marginal loss their bid has
caused to others. To fix ideas, consider the simple case where there is only one good to be
allocated. In this case, the auction system would allocate the good to the highest bidder,
and charge the second-highest bid (i.e., the loss to the bidder who would have received the
good otherwise) to the winner.
It can be shown that this mechanism maximizes the aggregate utility of bidders, since all the
goods are attributed to the participants with the highest willingness-to-pay. Furthermore,
if agents are fully rational and in the absence of collusion, the willingness to pay is reported
truthfully. This is because only the marginal harm to other bidders will be charged to each
participant, making truthful bidding a (weakly) dominant strategy. However, this type of
auction does not maximize the seller’s revenue. According to Facebook, though, this disad-
vantage is unimportant. The reason is that, although some revenue may be sacrificed in the
short run, in the long run the mechanism improves the relevance of the ad to the selected
audience and, therefore, the effectiveness of advertising on Facebook.
Facebook’s auction system is in fact more complex than the standard VCG auction, because
it considers not only the marginal loss to other bidders (advertisers), but also the loss to the
users who get exposed to the ads. Although the company does not disclose the details of this
procedure, the logic can be described as follows. For a given audience, Facebook calculates a
“relevance score” associated to each ad proposed by the respective bidders. The higher this
score, the higher the imputed loss to the audience when that advertiser’s bid is unsuccessful.
The score captures the “opportunity cost” of not seeing the ad. Facebook uses the relevance
score to determine which bids are successful and how much the winners should be charged
(that is, the size of the combined loss on users and other advertisers).
According to Facebook, this system minimizes the probability that ads are shown to unin-
terested audiences. Furthermore, it increases the price advertisers can expect to pay when
attempting to reach an audience that is also targeted by other relevant ads. This induces
advertisers to properly target ads at lucrative targets. Facebook favors ads that are directly
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relevant to the person browsing at the time. Less relevant ads cause higher ”social” harm,
so the price the advertiser pays increases as well. This feature implies that users who are
interested in politics are more likely to be exposed to politics-related ads.Finally, we expect
that the prices paid to reach audiences who are targeted by a greater number of candidates
should also increase, because, all else equal, a greater number of bidders interested in an
audience makes the marginal loss (and hence the final price) go up.
A.3 Ethical Considerations
In this section we explicitly explain why the use of the Facebook marketing API data does
not create any privacy risk for Facebook users, even though we believe it something that can
be clearly inferred from the explanations of the data collection.
The GDPR, one of the most conservative data protection regulations, defines what
personal data is in its Article 4: “‘personal data’ means any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such
as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity of that natural person”.
The Facebook marketing API only provides aggregate numbers of targeted audi-
ences. For instance if someone queries for the audience “ Users in Spain, aged between 20
and 30, male and interested in Science” the only information she will get is the number of
Facebook users within that audience. To the best of our knowledge it is unfeasible to retrieve
the identity of the actual users included in that audience. Based on the GDPR definition of
personal data the Facebook marketing API data used in our research cannot be considered
as personal data. Therefore, we can confirm there is no privacy/data protection risks for
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Facebook users derived from our research.
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